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[Tihe philosophy behind child welfare programs has swung like a pendulum
over time-going back and forth between the extremes of the perceived interests
of children and the perceived interests of the family.... [Oinly a balanced
approach that recognizes both interests will truly promote the well-being of
children.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The foster care system in the United States is universally re-
garded as a disaster: too many children languishing for too many
years, bouncing from foster home to foster home, or worse yet, return-
ing to the abusive or neglectful home only to face more danger. The
failures of the federal foster care system have spurred members of
Congress to advocate reform. 2
Answering the call for reform, Congress overwhelmingly
passed3 and, on November 19, 1997, President Clinton signed into law
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 ("ASFA"). 4 One of the
primary purposes of the ASFA is to correct many of the perceived
deficiencies of its predecessor, the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980 ("AACWA"). 5 The AACWA's requirement that
states use "reasonable efforts" to reunite foster children with their
1. The Safe Adoptions and Family Environments Act: Hearing to Consider S.511 Before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong., available in 1997 WL 271610 (testimony of Sister
Rose Logan on behalf of Catholic Charities USA) [hereinafter Logan testimony].
2. For example, during congressional debate, one congressman stated:
When a child of the streets stands before you in rags, with tear-stained face, you cannot
easily forget him, and yet you are perplexed what to do. The human soul is difficult to
interfere with. You hesitate how far you should go. Congress has been considering
adoption and foster care reform this year that has caused all of us to ask, how far should
we go? But after extensive research into the failure of the foster care system, I ask how
far can we go?
143 CONG. REC. S12,211 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
3. One of the few representatives to vote against the bill, Don Manzullo of Illinois,
summed up the large margin in three words: "Nobody read it." Toby Eckert & Dori Meinert,
LaHood: Adoption Law Infringes Upon States, STATE J. REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Jan. 2, 1998, at
2. Manzullo objected to the bill because it "is a very subtle, yet overt, effort that says that
parental rights are not as important as they should be." Id. at 3.
4. Pub. L. No. 105-89, §§ 101-501, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
5. Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 1, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. (1994)). Among the chief criticisms of the AACWA is that the bill has created a
system in which foster care becomes a permanent, rather than a temporary, life for children.
Congresswoman Pryce stated, "This bill corrects the perverse incentives of the current system
that gives States more money if they have more children in foster care. That is just crazy. Now
we will provide States more money if they reduce their foster care caseload by placing kids in
permanent, stable homes." 143 CoNG. REC. H10,789 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Pryce).
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biological parents6 drew the sharpest criticism as going too far to
ensure family preservation.7 The ASFA "clarifies" the reasonable
efforts requirement, providing that the child's safety shall be the
paramount concern in all foster care decisions. 8
Although this statute remedies some of the AACWA's
deficiencies, the ASFA also creates new problems. Of particular
concern is the provision that requires states to seek the termination of
parental rights, with few exceptions, in the case of any child who has
been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months.9
While this provision intends to create permanency for children in
foster care, it may instead terminate rights of parents who with
assistance could provide a stable home, without guaranteeing that the
child will be placed in a permanent home.1 Indeed, just as the
pendulum swung too far towards reunification in 1980, in 1998 the
pendulum is swinging too far towards termination."
This Note argues that the swing of the pendulum in either
direction is inconsistent with a child's best interests. Part II exam-
ines the failures of the AACWA and the "solution" embodied in the
ASFA. Part III discusses the shortcomings of the ASFA and argues
that its strong endorsement of adoption is both short-sighted and
inconsistent with a "best interests of the child" analysis. Part IV
discusses kinship foster care, in which extended family members of
6. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994).
7. On May 21, 1997, in testimony before the subcommittee on Social Security and Family
Policy of the Senate, Gary J. Stangler, Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services,
stated, "[a]lthough it was never intended that this provision be interpreted as requiring unrea-
sonable efforts, or returning children to unsafe homes or impeding permanency, Congress has
learned in previous hearings that in practice, such action is, on occasion, an unintended conse-
quence of an erroneous interpretation of the law." Hearing on Child Welfare Reform Before the
Subcomm. on Social Security and Family Policy of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong.,
available in 1997 WL 274386.
8. See § 101, 111 Stat. at 2116-17 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)).
9. See § 103(aX3), 111 Stat. at 2118 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)).
10. This provision only recognizes cases at each extreme, despite the fact that "most child
welfare cases do not fall into simple categories of good or bad, black or white. When they do,
experts usually agree about what to do. The vast majority of cases fall into a more difficult,
gray area, often involving 'a beleaguered parent with an uneven track record.'" Nancy Goldhill,
Ties That Bind: The Impact of Psychological and Legal Debates on the Child Welfare System, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 295,301 (1996) (citation omitted).
11. See R. Bruce Dold, Giving Kids a Little More Wiggle Room' CI. TuIB., Dec. 12, 1997,
at 27 (quoting drafter Patrick Murphy). Murphy notes, "It's a good idea to send the message
that we can't give these parents forever. But we have to be very careful in how we do it." Id.
Sister Rose Logan advocates a balanced approach: Termination of parental rights should be
swift when there is "blatant abuse" and when there is no hope of returning the children to their
biological parents, but "we should not ride the pendulum too far in this direction.... Families
that make mistakes must be given the support they need to become whole." See Logan
testimony, supra note 1.
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the child serve as foster parents, as a solution to the swinging pendu-
lum. Finally, Part V makes suggestions for a federal kinship care
policy.
II. FOSTER CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: REASONABLE
REUNIFICATION EFFORTS UNDER ATTACK
A. A Review of the Current Foster Care System
I
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that- parents have a
recognizable liberty interest in raising their children without
intrusion by the state.12 The parents' liberty interest is not, however,
absolute. The state, through its parens patriae power, has the duty to
intervene and protect a child when his or her parents have
endangered the child's well-being. 13 One modern embodiment of the
state's parens patriae power is the foster care system.14
Although the foster care system is implemented by individual
states, federal guidelines are the key to understanding this system
because states must comply with these guidelines in order to receive
federal funds under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act ("Title IV-
E").'5 Typically, the foster care process begins when a state child
12. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (recognizing that although the
state has an interest in the education of children, this interest does not outweigh the parents'
right to choose a method of education for their children more consistent with their religious
practices); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding that a law that deprived
parents from enrolling their children in the school of their choice was unconstitutional and
recognizing that "[t~he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and di-
rect his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.").
13. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing that '[a]cting
to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the
parent's control .... "). Justice Joseph Story wrote over a century ago that "[a]lthough, in
general, parents are entrusted with the custody of the persons.., of their children, yet this is
done upon the natural presumption, that the children will be properly taken care of... [blut,
whenever this presumption is removed.., the Court of Chancery will interfere, and deprive
him of custody of his children." Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43
HARV. EDUC. REV. 599 (1973) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 2 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1341 (1857)),
reprinted in ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND THE STATE 455-56
(3d ed. 1995).
14. Other examples of the state acting in its parens patriae power are laws prohibiting
child labor, requiring education, and creating "status offenses," activities which are crimes when
committed by those under a statutory age.
15. See generally MARIANNE TAKAS, KINSHIP CARE AND FAMILY PRESERVATION: OPTIONS
FOR STATES IN LEGAL AND PoLIcY DEVELOPMENT 11 (final rev. ed. 1994). Because of states'
efforts to reduce their own budgets, most states utilize the federally funded options. See id. at
13. Title IV-E requirements are enacted in 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679 (1994).
[Vol. 51:14271430
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welfare department receives a report of child abuse or neglect.16 In
most cases, a social worker then makes a home visit to determine
whether the situation requires state action, 17 and if so, whether the
child(ren) may safely remain with the parent(s) while the state
provides services, or whether the state must remove the child(ren)
immediately.' s
If the social worker determines that circumstances do not
require immediate removal, but that the home situation is still
problematic, the state must provide services to prevent foster care
placement.' 9 Although Title IV-E does not specify required services,
federal regulations contain suggested services,20 such as providing
daycare, homemaker services, counseling, and emergency financial
assistance. 21 The regulations also recommend that states provide job
training and substance abuse counseling when necessary.22
If these preventive services fail or if during the initial home
visit the social worker discovers an emergency situation from which
the child must be removed immediately, the agency will seek
temporary custody of the child23 and place the child in a group home
with a licensed foster family24 or with another family member.2 Since
16. Most complaints arise from social workers or police, but some also come from
neighbors, doctors, and teachers. MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 13, at 456.
17. See id. The law permits parents to use some degree of corporal punishment. In State
v. Crouser, 911 P.2d 725, 732 (Hawaii 1996), the Hawaii Supreme Court recognized that a
parent may use corporal punishment only to the extent that it is proportional to the offense and
reasonably believed necessary. Courts must balance a parent's privilege to use corporal
punishment with the state's interest to deter child abuse. See id. at 734. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts recognizes that a "parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to
impose such reasonable confinement upon his child as he reasonably believes to be necessary for
its proper control, training, or education." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 147 (1979). In
determining whether the force was reasonable, the considerations include the child's age and
physical and mental condition and the parent's motive in utilizing corporal punishment. See id.
§ 150. The purpose of the punishment is the primary consideration because "[fforce
applied... primarily for any purpose other than the proper training or education of the child or
for the preservation of discipline is not privileged although applied or imposed in an amount and
upon an occasion which would be privileged had it been applied for such purpose." Id. § 151.
18. See M.NOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 13, at 456.
19. Title IV-E requires that states use "reasonable efforts" to avoid the removal of the
child from the home. This requirement will be discussed extensively in Part II.
20. See DEBRA RATTERMAN ET AL., REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT FOSTER PLACEMENT:
A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTATION 4 (2d ed. 1987) (listing services suggested by the federal govern-
ment).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See JUNE MELVIN MICKENS & DEBRA RATrERMAN BAKER, MAaNG GOOD DECISIONS
ABOUT KINSHIP CARE 5 (1997) (noting that goal at this point "becomes speedy reunification with
the parents through specialized services").
24. Title 1V-E requires states to create and enforce a licensing procedure, which
"includ[es] standards related to admission policies, safety, sanitation, and protection of civil
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1996, federal law has required that states give a preference to a
relative over an unrelated prospective foster parent in determining
placement, provided that the relative satisfies the relevant child
protection standards. 6 Federal law also requires that the state place
the child in the "least restrictive" setting,27 which has been
interpreted as the "most family like" setting available.3
After removal, the state must establish a permanency plan for
the child.2 9 In most cases, the plan will seek eventual reunification of
the child and the parent.30 When this is the goal, states must make
"reasonable efforts" and provide services to accomplish reunification.31
If reunification is not the goal because of severe abuse or neglect or if
the child has been in the foster care system for a statutorily-
prescribed time period, the state is required to initiate or join proceed-
ings to terminate parental rights and "free" the child for adoption or
another permanent arrangement.3 2 Ideally, then, the state moves the
child out of the foster care system, either by returning the child to the
parent or by allowing another family to adopt the child.
B. Grim Realities of the Foster Care System
Statistics paint a disturbing picture of the United States' foster
care system, with the number of children entering the system
continually exceeding the number leaving. Commentators estimate
that more than a half-million children are in the foster care system,33
nearly double the number of a decade ago.3 Further, children placed
rights," for foster care providers. 42 U.S.C. § 671(aX10) (1994). Licenses typically require
training of the foster parent and require the home to meet certain health and safety standards.
See TAKAS, supra note 15, at 42.
25. See TAKAS, supra note 15, at 42.
26. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(19) (West Supp. 1998).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A) (1994).
28. MICKENS & BAKER, supra note 23, at 53.
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16). A permanency plan is also known as a case plan. As set
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 675(1), a case plan is a written document that covers several aspects of the
child placement program.
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B).
31. Id. The services are similar to those required before removal of the child. See supra
notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
32. These key provisions of the ASFA are included here only as a means of introduction to
the workings of the foster care system and will be discussed extensively later in this Note. See
infra Part HI.
33. See Pete du Pont, A Chance to Fix Foster Care, TAMPA TRM., Oct. 29, 1997, at 15.
Approximately 650,000 children spend at least some time in foster care each year. A study by
the Institute for Children found that at the end of fiscal year 1996, 526,000 children were in
state-run substitute care. See id.
34. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of
Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q.
[Vol. 51:14271432
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in foster care spend an average of three years in the system,35 and one
in ten will spend more than seven years in foster care. 36 Children who
eventually leave the foster care system through adoption typically
wait 3.5-5.5 years.3 7 Not only do children frequently spend extended
periods of time in foster care, but the system does not provide
consistency in the child's foster care situation, with the majority of
children having more than one placement.38  Further, 15,000 foster
children "age-out" of the system each year.39
These numbers demonstrate that the system is inadequate for
too many children. Although the AACWA was designed "to prevent
unnecessary foster care placements, to reunify families when possible,
and to limit time spent in foster care by encouraging adoption when
return to a natural parent is not possible,"40 this law has been largely
unsuccessful in achieving these goals.41 Indeed, Jennifer Toth, a
foster care expert, summarized the views of many people concerned
121, 138 (1995) (citing figures reported by the American Public Welfare Association). Between
1987 and 1992, the foster care population rose from 280,000 to 460,000. See id.
35. See 143 CONG. REc. S12,673 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
Senator Grassley was a chief advocate for reducing the time period a child may spend in foster
care before termination of parental rights. Driving home his concern about the three year
average, he stated, "That is three birthdays, three Christmases, and that is going through the
first, second, and third grades, without having a mom and a dad." Id. A 1993 report by the
American Civil Liberties Union revealed that one in four children who enter the system live in
foster care for more than four years.
36. See du Pont, supra note 33.
37. See Adoption and Support of Abused Children: Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 105th Cong., available in 1997 WL 14151914 (statement of Valora Washington, pro-
gram director for the Families for Kids Initiative of the W.K. Kellogg Foundation) [hereinafter
Washington testimony].
38. See Jill Sheldon, Note, 50,000 Children Are Waiting: Permanency, Planning and
Termination of Parental Rights Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,
17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 73, 77 (1997) (referring to the Supreme Court's findings in Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 836-37 (1977)). Sixty percent of children in foster
care will have more than one placement, and 28 percent will have three or more. See id.
39. See du Pont, supra note 33, at 15. A child "ages-out" when he or she achieves legal
adult status.
40. Guggenheim, supra note 34, at 122-23.
41. Guggenheim noted:
Any study of foster care in the United States over the past twenty years unavoidably
must grapple with a paradox: the national foster care population gained its greatest
increase in the decade immediately following the most dramatic overhaul of federal
foster care laws and policy in history, even though those changes were the result of a
consensus that too many children were being removed from their families.
Id. at 138. In the 1960s and 1970s, roughly one-third to one-half of foster kids returned home
soon after the initial removal, despite fewer state reunification efforts. See Marsha Garrison,
Parents' Rights vs. Children's Interests: The Case of the Foster Child, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 371, 375 (1996) [hereinafter Parents' Rights] (discussing termination of parental rights
and the history of the foster care system).
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with child welfare when she stated that if a child survives foster care,
"it's not because of the system, it's despite the system."42
C. The AACWA and "Reasonable Efforts"
Congress intended foster care to be a last resort. In enacting
the AACWA, Congress attempted to remedy premature removal of a
child from his family.4 The AACWA focused on preventive and
reunification efforts, setting forth that before states spend federal
funds on foster care, they should provide services that could make
placement unnecessary and a return to home feasible.4 The AACWA,
however, did not define "reasonable efforts" and therefore the states
had the responsibility of interpreting this federal policy.45 Critics of
the AACWA argue that many states interpreted "reasonable efforts"
to mean every effort.46
One of the AACWA's main problems was that it created a ten-
sion as agencies committed to reunification discouraged bonding
between foster parents and foster children4 7 while at the same time,
out of concern for child safety, discouraged contact with the child's
biological parents.48  Indeed, despite the "reasonable efforts"
requirement for reunification, communication between the child wel-
fare agency and the child's biological parents decreases after the first
year.49 Moreover, the longer a child remains in foster care, the
42. Cheryl Wetzstein, Case Studies Expose Failings of Foster Care; Writer Champions
Better Chance for 'Orphans of Living', WASH. TIMEs, May 13, 1997, at A2 (quoting Jennifer
Toth).
43. See RATTERMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 1 (discussing the "reasonable efforts"
requirement and its purpose).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 3. Examples of state definitions are "the exercise of ordinary diligence and
care" (Missouri), "the exercise of reasonable diligence and care" (Florida), and "the exercise of
reasonable diligence and care... to utilize all available services related to meeting the needs of
the juvenile and the family" (Arkansas). Id.
46. See 143 CoNG. REc. H10,788 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kennelly)
(noting that "reasonable efforts became every effort, [thus] putting a child at risk").
47. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 856, 861-62 (1997)
(Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart bluntly stated that any case in which a foster parent
assumes the emotional role of a child's biological parent is a failure of the foster care system,
which is intended to be temporary care. See id. at 861-67.
48. "Foster children have been caught in the middle: As a result of the system's
conflicting aims, they have been left to drift in long term temporary placements with little hope
of any stable parental relationship." Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35
STAN. L. REV. 423, 441-42 (1983) [hereinafter Why Terminate?].
49. See id. at 428 (noting that this lack of contact is one of many factors contributing to
foster care drift).
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greater the possibility that the child will lose all contact with his or
her biological parents.50
At the same time that the biological parents' contact with the
child decreases, the child often moves from one foster care home to
another.51 Often, states remove children from the foster home because
the foster family becomes attached to the child.52 Thus, the AACWA
resulted in a de facto policy that created a situation in which children
spent many years detached from their biological parents and were
prevented from forming any new attachments to their (multiple sets
of) foster parents.
This system should trouble society. Despite data indicating
that many families do not receive the services that could enable foster
children to return safely to their biological parents,53 public attention
has focused on the cases involving children who return to abusive
homes. The public expresses outrage about cases in which a child
dies as a result of abuse after child welfare authorities have inter-
vened. Indeed, estimates show that child welfare authorities have
investigated or received reports on half of all children eventually
murdered by a parent or other family member.5 Although nothing
could or should lessen concern for such an alarming situation, when
formulating child welfare policy, we must also recognize that such
cases "[a]lthough highly publicized,... are in a distinct minority." 5
The vast majority of children are in foster care because of neglect, not
50. See id. at 426 (noting that once a child enters the foster care system there is a 50
percent chance that the child will remain there for at least two years).
51. See Sheldon, supra note 38, at 77 (discussing the Supreme Court's statistical data in
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 836-37 (1997)).
52. See Why Terminate?, supra note 48, at 430.
53. Because of the large volume of cases, most child welfare agencies are overworked,
underfunded, and understaffed. As a result, "child welfare workers too often mete out a blanket
prescription of parenting classes and counseling instead of developing a customized service plan
based on a comprehensive assessment of the family's strengths and needs." Goldhill, supra note
10, at 307.
54. See Mona Charen, A Chance to Give Children a Childhood, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 7,
1997, at 11A (discussing the House bill advocating adoption and deeming child safety the main
concern of child welfare agencies).
55. MNOOKMN & WEISBERG, supra note 13, at 459. This Note does not argue that because
severe physical abuse cases represent a small portion of all foster care cases, foster care law
should assume reunification is in the best interests of all children. Rather, this Note argues
that assuming termination is in the best interests of all children who have been in the foster
care system for a given time period (12 months under the ASFA) is the major problem. Foster
care law must contain the tools for differentiating between families that can and cannot be
reunited. This Note endorses the sections of the ASFA that clarify that a child's safety should
be the paramount concern and allow termination to be based upon severe abuse.
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abuse,56 and therefore state-provided services could help many
families better care for their children.5 7  The law has recently
responded not with increased services in support of reunification, 58
but with an emphasis on creating permanency for children through
speedier termination of parental rights and increased support for
adoption.
D. Congress Responds: The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
The purpose behind the ASFA is to provide "safe, loving, and
permanent homes" for foster children.59 Congress sought to effectuate
this goal through a number of provisions. The ASFA amended the
Social Security Act to "clarify" the AACWA's "reasonable efforts"
requirement, 60 by providing several examples of when reasonable
reunification efforts are not required,61 including when the parent has
"subjected the child to aggravated circumstances," committed any one
of the enumerated violent crimes upon any of the parent's children, or
had his or her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect
to any other child.62 The ASFA also mandates that in determining
56. See Gail Vida Hamburg, An Act of Compassion May Require Some Decisive Actions to
Make It Work, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1998, at Womanews 1 (reporting on ASFA and noting that
critics of the law point out that many children are in foster care because of a lack of
supervision).
57. See 143 CONG. REC. S12,670 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Dewine) ("We
need to make sure that the families who are in trouble, but who can be saved, do get help, and
that they get good help, and that they get it before it is too late.").
58. Perhaps one of the reasons that the law has not increased fimding for reunification
services is the difficulty in determining their effect. As Martin Guggenheim noted,
"[u]nfortunately, it is easier to determine what happens to children after entering foster care
than to study the more qualitative assessments involved in evaluating the effectiveness of
preventive services before children enter foster care." Guggenheim, supra note 34, at 125.
59. 143 CONG. REC. H10,787 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kennelly).
Representative Kennelly further stated, "this legislation we can all agree on is putting children
on a fast track from foster care to safe and loving and permanent homes. This is what this is all
about." Id. Many of her colleagues echoed this sentiment. Representative Camp stated, "this
bill will ensure that a permanent, loving home is within the reach of every child." 143 CONG.
REC. H1O,788 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997). Senator Devine stated, "I see an America and want an
America... where every child has the opportunity to live in a safe, a stable, a loving and a
permanent home." 143 CONG. REC. S12,670 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997).
60. Under the ASFA, the state is required to make "reasonable efforts" to "preserve and
reunify" the family before foster care is necessary and to make it possible for the child to return
home safely after removal. ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a)(A)-(B), Ill Stat. 2115, 2116
(1997) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994)).
61. See id. § 1O1(aXD), 111 Stat. at 2116-17. If "reasonable efforts" are not required, the
state must hold a permanency hearing for the child within thirty days.
62. Id.
1436
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"reasonable efforts," "the child's health and safety shall be the para-
mount concern."63
In addition to ensuring a child's safety, the ASFA offers adop-
tion as the solution for the skyrocketing foster care population.
Section 201 of the ASFA authorizes adoption incentives to states,
providing as much as six thousand dollars per child adopted."
Further, the ASFA tightens two important timelines for children in
foster care, those regarding permanency hearings and termination of
parental rights. Section 302 of the ASFA requires a permanency
hearing to be held within twelve months of the child entering foster
care.65 Section 103(a) requires that the state file or join a petition to
terminate the parental rights of any child if he or she has been in
foster care for fifteen of the twenty-two most recent months, unless a
relative is caring for the child, a compelling reason exists why termi-
nation would not be in the best interests of the child, or the state did
not provide "reasonable efforts" for reunification if necessary.66
III. THE PENDULUM SWINGS: THE RENEWED EMPHASIS ON
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS BY THE ASFA
Although the ASFA's stricter parental termination provisions
appear to be consistent with the statute's purpose, the termination
standard will likely harm more children than it will help. This Part
63. Id. § 101(aXA), 111 Stat. at 2116. Representative Kennelly recognized that:
[tjhis might sound like common sense, but we told the States about 15 years ago to
make reasonable efforts to reunify families, without telling them exactly what we meant
by reasonable. Unfortunately, in practice, reasonable efforts became every effort,
putting a child at risk. So we are now telling States there are times when returning a
child home presents too great a risk to that child's safety ....
143 CoNG. REC. H10,788 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997).
64. ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89 § 201(d), 111 Stat. 2115, 2123 (1997) (amending 42 U.S.C.§§ 670-679 (1994)). States in which the number of foster children adopted exceeds the average
number of foster children adopted in the state in 1995, 1996, and 1997 receive $4000 per child
adopted above the average, and an extra $2000 per "special needs" child. Id. "Special needs"
refers to children who are traditionally difficult to place, including children with disabilities,
minority children, and older children. For a critique of the overuse of "special needs," see
Sheldon, supra note 38, at 94 (noting that "this term has been used to encompass so many
groups, that children who actually do require special care are being lumped together with other
children who do not have special needs.").
65. ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89 § 302, 111 Stat. 2115, 2128 (1997) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
675(5)(C) (1994)). Under the AACWA, the state was required to hold a "dispositional" hearing
within 18 months. The ASFA now requires a hearing to establish a "permanency plan" for each
child establishing when a child is to be returned to his or her biological parent, placed for
adoption, or placed with a legal guardian or in any other "planned permanent living
arrangement." Id. § 302(4), 111 Stat. at 2128-29.
66. Id. § 103(aX3), 111 Stat. at 2118 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)).
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discusses why adoption is a politically attractive policy choice but
shows that because the termination standard assumes rather than
requires a showing that termination would be in the child's best inter-
ests, this standard is inconsistent with a child-centered legal
approach.
A. The Appeal of Adoption
The emotional appeal of successful adoption has motivated the
policy that encourages parental rights termination. During debate
prior to the passage of the ASFA, one congresswoman told the story of
a three-year old girl. When the child met her adoptive family, her
first comment, standing in front of them with her hands on her hips,
was, "Where have you been? Where have you been?"67 It is difficult to
think of a more compelling image or a better rallying cry for reform.
In comparison to the sobering image of the average foster child, who
spends his childhood bouncing from foster home to foster home, this
three-year-old is presented as a vision of hope, a child who escaped
the system and was placed in a loving home.
Indeed, it is precisely these images of foster children, one of
hope, the other of hopelessness, that have swung the pendulum to
termination in order to "free" children for adoption. As a result, many
believe, as columnist Mona Charen stated, that "[dienying adoption to
many of these kids means denying them a childhood."68 Professor
Marsha Garrison, a vocal critic of timeline termination as the solution
to the foster care problem, argues that although it is understandable
that children's advocates encourage adoption because it provides
benefits such as "a sense of belonging" and "the right to feel part of a
family," the pro-termination policy has gone too far.69 For example,
even the terminology commonly associated with foster care, such as
describing a child as being in "limbo," furthers the pro-termination
policy.70 According to Garrison, "[tihe implication is clear: Adoption
promises salvation; foster care ensures suffering."71
67. 143 CoNG. REC. H10,790 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kennelly).
68. Mona Charen, Adoption-Children Deserve House Bill, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 18,
1997, at 11A.
69. Parents'Rights, supra note 41, at 389.
70. See id. at 390.
71. Id.
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B. Termination and the Best Interests of the Child
A "best interests of the child" analysis does not automatically
support the emphasis on termination of parental rights in favor of
adoption.72 Indeed, the concept of "best interests of the child" con-
templates that the adjudicator consider what is best for each individ-
ual child.73 Timeline termination standards, on the other hand, pre-
sume that termination is in the best interests of every child and re-
quire proof of a compelling reason that it is not.74 Thus, this provision
of the ASFA is inconsistent with the contemporary child custody legal
framework. 7
The "best interests of the child" analysis is the primary factor
when determining whether or not to terminate parental rights of
parents whose children are in the foster care system.76 The inquiry
does not focus on whether the foster parent can provide a better home
for the child than the birth parent.77 Rather, "the State's interest in
finding the child an alternative permanent home arises only 'when it
is clear that the natural parent cannot or will not provide a normal
72. See Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of Parental
Rights Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397, 401 (1996) (stating that
termination may not provide children with a stable home life).
73. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 268-72 (1975), reprinted in MNOOKIN &
WEISBERG, supra note 13, at 721 (discussing consequences on children of coercive removal from
parents).
74. See ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2115, 2118 (1997) (amending 42
U.S.C. § 675(5) (1994)).
75. Judge Cardozo is credited first with enunciating the "best interests of the child"
doctrine. See LeAnn Larson LaFave, Origins and Evolution of the "Best Interest of the Child"
Standard, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 459,467 (1989). In Finlay v. Finlay, Judge Cardozo wrote that
a judge must exercise the parens patriae power as a "wise, affectionate, and careful parent." 148
N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (quoting Queen v. Gyngall, 2 Eng. Rep. 232, 238 (Q.B. 1893)).
Although the "best interests of the child" standard has been criticized as vague and value-laden,
it continues to be used by courts determining custody. The standard typically requires an
examination of factors relating to a child's safety, happiness, and physical, mental, and moral
welfare. See Harvey R. Sorkow, Best Interests Of The Child: By Whose Definition?, 18 PEPP. L.
REV. 383, 384 (1991).
76. See, e.g., In re J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1986) (adopting the "best interests of
the child" standard as a "paramount consideration in termination of parental rights
proceedings").
77. See In re Michael B., 604 N.E.2d 122, 130-32 (N.Y. 1992) (examining interests of long-
term foster parents attempting to keep child from birth father). In Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977), the Supreme Court recognized that although foster
parents have an interest in dispositional proceedings, "that interest must be substantially
attenuated where the proposed removal from the foster family is to return the child to his
natural parents."
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family home for the child.'" 78 Until the state has proven that the
parent is unfit, both the parent and the child have an interest in
preventing wrongful termination of this relationship. 79
Instead, the "best interests of the child" standard requires "a
balancing of the child's interest in preserving the parent-child rela-
tionship, an interest shared by the parents, against any competing
interests of the child."o Although the child's stability, of which length
of time in foster care is certainly an important factor, is a "competing
[interest] of the child,"81 it should not be the only factor in the equa-
tion. For example, an adjudicator should also consider the child's
preferences when evaluating which placement alternative is better for
the child. 2 Other factors used to determine whether termination of
parental rights is in the child's best interests include the child's age,
the risk of harm to the child, the child's attachment to his or her
parents and to his or her potential adoptive parents, and the likeli-
hood that the child will be adopted. The timeline termination stan-
dard of the ASFA, however, does not include a balancing test.
Instead, it mandates that the state terminate parental rights after a
statutorily-prescribed time period.83
The ASFA's use of the timeline termination standard risks
unfairly biasing decisions against the biological parents. For exam-
ple, in In re J.M., J.M, and M.M., the Supreme Court of Minnesota
rejected a mother's argument that timeline termination was not in
her children's best interests, reasoning that because the plain
language of the Minnesota statute required termination after a
prescribed time period, long-term foster care was never in a child's
best interests.8 The court held that the "best interests" inquiry
required only a determination that the statutory time frame had
expired, even though one of the children's therapists believed that
continued contact with the mother was in the child's best interests.85
78. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767 (1982) (quoting N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-
b.l(aXiv) (McKinney 1992)). In Santosky, the Supreme Court addressed the burden of proof a
state must carry before termination and held that the proper standard is "clear and convincing
evidence." Id. at 747-48.
79. See id. at 760-61. The state must demonstrate unfitness because the parents' liberty
interest in the custody and care of their child "does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the state." Id. at 753.
80. In re M.G., 407 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2115, 2118 (1997) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
675(5) (1994)).
84. 574 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 1998).
85. See id. at 721 (noting that the child's guardian ad litem did recommend termination,
despite the therapist's opinion).
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The court also did not require an inquiry into the "adoptability" of the
children prior to termination of their parents' parental rights.86 This
case illustrates how timeline termination standards severely constrict
the "best interests of the child" analysis because courts assume that
termination is necessary for permanency.
C. The Effects of Parental Rights Termination on the Child
Placing children up for adoption who cannot quickly return
home improperly "measure[s] permanency by the legal label attached
to their situation."s7 Favoring adoption over reunification ignores
evidence that parental capacity does not affect the strength of the
parent-child bond.88 For the majority of foster children, adoption by a
new family does not lessen the child's their attachment to her
biological parents.8 9
The psychological effects of termination can be devastating to a
child. For example, the adoption may result in lower self-esteem and
lack of identity, or a child may have a loyalty conflict between her
adoptive and biological families.9 0 Additional problems can also re-
sult. Because a child's identity is typically intertwined with his or her
biological family,91 terminations can splinter a child. Finally, "the
child's knowledge that the parent lives, but is unavailable, also hin-
ders his ability to effectively mourn his loss."92
86. See id. at 724.
87. Goldhill, supra note 10, at 303.
88. See Parents'Rights, supra note 41, at 379.
89. Many people assume that the younger a child is when he or she is placed in foster
care, the less likely the child will be "permanently" attached to his or her biological parents. See
Hamburg, supra note 56 (arguing that termination standards should allow the needs of individ-
ual children to be weighed and that the child's age should be considered). Professor Garrison,
however, believes that the phenomenon of adopted children searching for their biological
parents supports the argument that an absent parent will always remain important to the child.
See Parents' Rights, supra note 41, at 382 (noting the "extraordinary lengths" some take to
obtain information about their origins).
90. According to psychologist Matthew B. Johnson:
[When children are adopted as a result of some perceived inadequacy in their
parents.., a significant risk of a negative impact on the child's identity and self-esteem
results. When the message is that the parents were inadequate to provide care and the
child cannot visit or even see the family of origin, the child must either disconnect
psychologically from the family of origin, with the resultant loyalty conflict, or accept
some injury to their self-esteem for maintaining some identification with the 'defective'
family.
Johnson, supra note 72, at 415.
91. See Goldhill, supra note 10, at 300 (discussing other writers who advocate this
position).
92. Why Terminate?, supra note 48, at 466.
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In contrast, studies have revealed that children who continue
to have contact with their biological parents after removal to a foster
home are more secure than children who have no contact.9 3 These
children are also more likely to be content with their foster parents, 94
and score higher on emotional and intellectual development tests.95
Further, parental visitation has no effect on whether the children
view their foster homes as permanent or temporary.96 Studies also
challenge the theory that allowing parents to visit their children
removes any incentive for the parents to take the steps necessary to
change the home environment so that the children can return.97
Still, the ASFA disregards evidence that suggests children are
generally more stable with continuing parental contact and assumes
that termination of parental rights and traditional adoption are in the
best interests of foster children who cannot return home quickly.
D. Adoption Not Guaranteed
Another problem with the ASFA is its inability to guarantee
that children "freed" for adoption will be adopted. Perhaps most
striking, ASFA's timeline termination implicitly assumes that the
possibility of adoption is in the best interests of most children in long-
term foster care. Although the ASFA mandates that states petition to
terminate parental rights after a child spends a certain amount of
time in child welfare custody,98 the law cannot guarantee that another
family will adopt the child.
A 1996 study revealed that 22,491 children were adopted from
foster care. 99 Roughly ten percent of the entire foster care population
were legally "free" for adoption but not adopted.1°0 Although adop-
tions of foster care children are increasing' 01 (and were increasing
93. See id. at 461 (summarizing the results of one such study).
94. See id. at 462 (noting that "being loved by their own mothers evidently helped in their
relationship with their foster parents").
95. See id. at 463 (summarizing the results of a Columbia University study).
96. See id. at 464 (noting that none of these studies showed such an effect).
97. See id at 483 (noting that the research instead emphasizes that "a nonpunitive
working alliance with the natural parent is necessary to help him change his behavior").
98. Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2115, 2118 (1997) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
675(5) (1994)) (requiring petition if child spent 15 of last 22 months in custody).
99. See du Pont, supra note 33, at 15 (citing a study by the Institute for Children).
100. See id.
101. Since 1994, adoptions of foster children have increased by 74 percent in New York City
and 72 percent in Philadelphia. See id. President Clinton's "Adoption 2002" program aspires to
double the number of children either adopted or permanently placed from the foster care system
by the year 2002. See HHS Awards Grants to Increase Adoptions, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 20, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 14467466.
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even before the ASFA's tighter timelines for termination became
effective), the number of adoptable children greatly exceeded the
number of foster children adopted.
Psychologist Martin Guggenheim studied the effects of two
states' policies that favored termination of parental rights and adop-
tion for foster children. His study revealed that the number of chil-
dren adopted from foster care lagged behind the number of children
entering the system'0 2 and that such a policy left a significant number
of children without either adoptive or biological parents. 0 3  He
concluded that even under the AACWA, which supposedly
emphasized reunification over adoption, child welfare policy "resulted
in creating the highest number of unnatural orphans in the history of
the United States."1°4 One can only guess the effect of a welfare policy
openly advocating timeline termination.
E. A System Failing Families
Although the ASFA imposes stringent time limits, it fails to
increase preventive and reunification services. Without these serv-
ices, the shortened timeline could harm a child because an agency
may either prematurely send the child home or unnecessarily "free"
him or her for adoption. 0 5 The Child Welfare League of America
contends that the "government is abandoning its responsibility to help
troubled families solve the problems that lead to child abuse and
neglect" by reducing the termination time line without offering
increased services.1°6 The organization argues that the government
102. See Guggenheim, supra note 34, at 127.
103. See id. at 130. Guggenheim argued:
Termination of parental rights obviously should play a role in the effort to reduce the
amount of time children spend in foster care. However, the increase in terminations of
parental rights should have been the last step to be implemented as part of reform, not
the first. Unfortunately, it is understandably easier to develop timelines and standards
for when termination actions should be filed once children have entered foster care than
to enforce rigorously strict compliance with preventive and reunification efforts.
Id. at 139.
104. Id. at 140.
105. See Adoption and Support of Abused Children: Testimony Submitted to the Senate
Finance Comm. for the Hearing on the Pass Act, S.1195, 105th Cong., available in 1997 WL
141519110 (testimony by the Child Welfare League of America) [hereinafter CWLA Testimony].
106. Id. This testimony was submitted about an earlier Senate version of the ASFA, the
Promotion of Adoption, Safety, and Support for Abused and Neglected Children Act.
Sister Rose Logan fears that "[t]here is a danger that the very strong emphasis on
adoption... will be a signal to state and local officials that they don't have to do anything to
reunite families or keep them together, even when the abuse or neglect is not chronic or severe."
Logan testimony, supra note 1.
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can best ensure child safety and permanency by providing families
with supportive services. 107
Indeed, some commentators believe that the ASFA falsely
assumes that child welfare agencies do not make mistakes.108 In
addition, the slow pace in which cases move through the complex
foster care system may result in premature parental termination.109
Thus, the ASFA creates a substantial risk that families who could
remain intact with state assistance will be destroyed.110
F. The Politics of Termination
The ASFA's determination that timeline termination is in the
best interests of the child without giving courts the latitude to
conduct a "best interests of the child" inquiry disproportionately
affects the most socially and politically impotent segments of the
population, as these groups are disproportionately represented among
foster children.
In order to increase the number of children available for
adoption, Congress enacted strict parental termination provisions in
the ASFA."' Arguably, the lobbying of potential adoptive parents
persuaded Congress to adopt this policy. Adoption was not heralded
as a potential solution to the foster care problem until the pool of
potential adoptive parents outnumbered the supply of babies."2
107. See Child Welfare Revision: Testimony Submitted to the Senate Finance Subcomm. on
Social Security and Family Policy for the Hearing, "Child Welfare Reform," 105th Cong.,
available in 1997 WL 10572022 (testimony of the Child Welfare League of America).
108. See Hamburg, supra note 56 (noting that '[aiggressively pursuing the termination of
parental rights without recognizing the frequency of mistakes or that most parents in the
system are negligent but not abusive will hurt families").
109. See id.
110. Even before the ASFA, these problems existed:
[C]hild welfare agencies generally lack[ed] the resources necessary to assess whether a
family might be kept intact if provided with supportive services, let alone to provide
those services. Government policy supports the removal of children, termination of
parental rights, and adoption because they are politically expedient and less costly in
the short run. In short, government has turned its back on poor families and children.
Goldhill, supra note 10, at 310.
111. See Johnson, supra note 72, at 402. One commentator notes:
Parental rights termination hearings are chiefly concerned with the facts and specific
circumstances of the instant case. The ultimate legal question, that is, the decision to
terminate or maintain parental rights, is not a decision based solely upon empirical
findings. Rather, it is a value-laden decision based on social policy, competing priorities,
and law.
Id.
112. See Parents' Rights, supra note 41, at 376. Many couples seek to adopt because of
infertility and are looking for a child of their own. See id. at 387. A recent survey revealed that
although 50 percent of people would rather adopt than remain childless, they believed that
having their own children is preferable. More troubling, a quarter of respondents believed that
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The politics of foster care are the politics of social classes."3
Although only twenty percent of children who do not live with their
biological parents are in the foster care system, the biological families
of between sixty and eighty percent of foster children receive some
kind of public welfare. 114 Further, most children in f6ster care come
from poor, single-parent homes. In contrast, the majority of adoptive
couples are middle-class and married. 115  Thus, foster children
adopted by middle-class parents are often advantaged socially and
economically."6
The foster care system also disproportionately affects African-
Americans. In 1994, African-American children accounted for forty-
seven percent of foster children, although they consisted of only
fifteen percent of the general population under eighteen."7 Thirty-two
percent of the foster care population and sixty-seven percent of the
general population were Caucasian children."8 African-American
children also disproportionately remain in the system: of those
children leaving the system, fifty percent are Caucasian and only
twenty-nine percent are African-American." 9
Perhaps most telling about the relationship between foster
care and class is the fact that foster care payments are frequently two
to four times greater than the amount of welfare a state will allocate
to the biological parent for care of the same child. 20 Foster care is
it is unlikely that a child would love his or her adoptive parents as much as his or her biological
parents. The survey revealed that women were most likely to consider adoption, but that men,
minorities, and the less-educated viewed adoption less favorably. See Hamburg, supra note 56.
113. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 833 (1977) (recognizing
that "foster care has been condemned as a class-based intrusion into the life of the poor" and
that "the poor resort to foster care more often than other citizens.").
114. See Why Terminate?, supra note 48, at 432. Garrison posits that most middle-class
families in crisis can afford services that would prevent the need for foster care. See id. at 433.
115. See Parents'Rights, supra note 41, at 387.
116. See id.
117. See Washington testimony, supra note 37 (discussing findings based on data from
twenty-one states).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Randi Mandelbaum, Trying to Fit Square Pegs Into Round Holes: The Need for a
New Funding Scheme for Kinship Caregivers, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907, 915 (1995).
In 1996, Congress repealed the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program
and replaced it with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF"). See Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2105 (1996). TANF makes clear that welfare benefits are not entitlements and poses strict
requirements on who may receive TANF payments and for how long. See Daan Braveman &
Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing Children from the Home for Poverty Alone, 70
TEMP. L. REV. 447, 447 (1997). Braveman and Ramsey note that the "welfare benefit reductions
are expected to result in an additional 1.3 million children falling below the poverty line in the
United States, which already has a higher percentage of its children living in poverty than other
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expensive. Indeed, the single largest block of federal funding for child
welfare programs finances low-income foster care children.121
Economics may also contribute to an increased emphasis on
adoption rather than reunification. A goal of reunification in foster
care leaves the federal and state governments with a fiscal crisis: on
top of the expense of foster care, long-term preventive and
reunification efforts are also costly.122 In comparison to foster care,
even subsidized adoption is relatively inexpensive for states.1
Although Congress passed the ASFA to increase permanency
in the lives of children, common sense suggests that Congress also
wanted to decrease the amount of federal funds spent on foster care. 124
Discussing the ASFA, Senator Rockefeller noted that "[a]t the heart of
the recent debate about the best policy for adoption and child welfare"
are questions regarding how Congress will allocate federal funds. 125
Economics, however, cannot be the sole reason for termination of
parental rights. Other options, such as open adoption, in which the
biological parent(s) retains visitation rights, and foster guardianship
are inexpensive.126
A timeline termination policy implicitly assumes that a child
needs a permanent home with a single set of parents 2 7 without con-
high-income countries." Id. Although welfare is being slashed for parents raising their
children, there has been no corresponding decrease in the payments that foster care parents
receive. Foster care payments typically are higher than TANF payments. See MICKENS &
BAKER, supra note 23, at 30.
121. See 143 CoNG. REC. S12,672 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
122. See Parents' Rights, supra note 41, at 391. Garrison notes that although these
services are necessary, most states only provide "meager, brief, and cheap" services. Professor
Goldhill argues that:
[Tjhe de facto decision not to invest more in supporting poor families simply ignores the
tragic consequences of this decision for innocent children. The short-sightedness of this
approach is clear. Although the service approaches... seem time-consuming and
costly... in the long-run, customized family support will prove less time-
consuming-and less costly-than business as usual.
Goldhill, supra note 10, at 309.
123. See Parents'Rights, supra note 41, at 386.
124. Almost in prophecy, Jill Sheldon wrote that some "politicians believe that when
welfare reform begins, adoptions will be relied on to save the child welfare system. If increasing
adoptions is the solution to cutting child welfare, adoptions will not only have to be made easier,
but will also have to be emphasized." Sheldon, supra note 38, at 92.
125. 143 CoNG. REC. S12,671 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997).
126. See Parents'Rights, supra note 41, at 386. Professor Garrison argues that one reason
the state favors traditional adoption is because it attracts potential adoptive parents looking for
a child of their own. See id. at 387. Thus, "[tiermination of parental rights followed by adoption
thus meets both the fiscal needs of the state and the desires of a well-organized and sympathetic
adult interest group." Id.
127. Several authors have noted that there is a divide in custody theory between divorce
and foster care cases. In cases of divorce, there is almost universal agreement that continued
contact with the noncustodial parent benefits the child. For foster children, however, there is a
belief that if the child cannot return home quickly, termination of parental rights and adoption
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sidering the harm that may result. This ASFA provision therefore
replaces the contemporary "best interests of the child" analysis with
an artificial one that assumes termination is in the child's best inter-
ests.
IV. THE NEED FOR A BALANCED APPROACH: THE PROMISE
OF KINSHIP FOSTER CARE
This Note has demonstrated that neither the AACWA's em-
phasis on reunification nor the ASFA's emphasis on termination is
consistent with the "best interests of the child" legal framework. The
AACWA failed because the statute did not give states adequate guid-
ance in determining what reunification efforts should be made. The
AACWA resulted in a dramatic increase in the foster child population.
In an attempt to ameliorate this problem, Congress passed the ASFA.
Unfortunately, Congress unnecessarily favored parental termination,
which will likely lead to a dramatic increase in the legal orphan popu-
lation. This Note argues that the development of kinship care policies
may provide a middle ground between reunification at all costs and
timeline termination.
A. Understanding Kinship Foster Care
The American Bar Association defines kinship care as "any
form of residential caregiving provided to children by kin, whether
full-time or part-time, temporary or permanent, and whether initiated
by private family agreement or under custodial supervision of a state
child welfare agency."128 Beyond the legalese is a simple concept:
family members helping each other care for children. Kinship
caregivers may prevent the need for state intervention by providing
advice, helping with everyday responsibilities, such as babysitting or
providing transportation, caring for the children overnight or longer
to relieve a parent, or combining households. 129
is in the child's best interests. See Parents' Rights, supra note 41, at 373; see also Goldhill,
supra note 10, at 297. But see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (2d ed. 1981) (applying the psychological parent theory to both cases and favoring com-
plete control by the custodial parent).
128. TAKAS, supra note 15, at 3.
129. See MICKENS & BAKER, supra note 23, at 7.
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Most kinship care arrangements result from private family
arrangements without state involvement.10 Roughly four million
children under the age of eighteen live with a family member other
than a parent.1 1 One in ten grandparents raise a grandchild for at
least six months, with one-fifth of them raising a grandchild for more
than ten years.13 2
In some population segments, kinship care is a revival of an
informal child welfare system.13 This type of care has also become an
integral part of state child welfare policy.'m As a result, kinship care
is "by far the fastest-growing foster care initiative."135
B. Kinship Foster Care and Current Law
Currently, states must incorporate kinship foster caregivers
into the traditional foster care system in order to qualify them for
federal funding.'36 States, however, must give preference to kinship
caregivers over non-relatives if the relatives meet the relevant state
130. See id.
131. See Beth Witrogen McLeod, The Second Time Around: The Number of Grandparents
Raising Grandchildren Is Exploding-But Kinship Foster Care Is Gaining A Voice, S.F.
EXAMINER, Aug. 12, 1997, at C1. Given that child welfare resources are already strained with
the half-million foster children, without kinship care, the system would likely collapse. The
reasons behind the growth in kinship care are "a mix of modern sociocultural sorrows: teen
pregnancy, abandonment, alcohol and drug abuse, homicide, neglect, poverty, AIDS,
incarceration, [and] unemployment." Id. Eighty-five percent of kinship care arrangements are
the result of parental substance abuse. See Catherine Darnell, Grand Parents, TENNESSEAN,
Oct. 26, 1997, at IF.
132. See McLeod, supra note 131. Between 1980 and 1990, it is estimated that the number
of grandparents raising grandchildren increased between 44 and 300 percent. See id.; see also
143 CONG. REC. E812 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Stokes).
133. See Jon Jeter, Foster Care's Relative Solution: As States Nurture an Old Custom,
Extended Families Fill a Larger Role in Helping Children from Broken Homes, WASH. POST,
Apr. 16, 1997, at AOl. Kinship care is especially prevalent in African-American families. In
New York City, 90 percent of kinship care children are African-American. In Philadelphia and
Maryland, the numbers are 88 and 89 percent, respectively. According to social policy analysts,
this trend is a return to the informal child welfare system of African-American families prior to
the civil rights movement: "Because they were unaware or suspicious of the local child welfare
agencies, or simply excluded, black families often were left to their own devices in dealing with
relatives incapacitated by mental illness or alcohol. Relatives took up the slack." Id.
134. Kinship foster care is "kinship care provided for a child who is in the legal custody of
the state child welfare agency." TAKAS, supra note 15, at 3.
135. Jeter, supra note 133. About a third of foster care children now live with relatives.
See id One child welfare advocate predicts that "over the next three to five years, kinship care
will become the model for foster care." Id. Kinship care placements increased 29 percent
between 1990 and 1995. See Washington testimony, supra note 37.
136. See Washington testimony, supra note 37. States may not exclude relative caregivers
from federal foster care funds if the relative otherwise qualifies. See Miller v. Youakim, 440
U.S. 125, 137 (1979). States may, however, exclude relative caregivers from state funds. See
Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1992).
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child protection standards.137 Because of these two federal require-
ments for receipt of Title IV-E funds, states can choose among three
options to develop kinship foster care laws. First, states may require
kinship caregivers to meet the exact same licensing requirements as
traditional foster parents.138 This option is used by a majority of
states, either because of an express policy choice or because of a
failure to consider kinship caregivers separately.139  Although
equitable, this option excludes some willing relatives from providing
care because of economic considerations.14
A second option is to lessen the standards for becoming a kin-
ship caregiver by waiving criteria that do not directly relate to child
safety and to provide the same benefits to kin and non-kin foster care
providers.'4' This approach provides the greatest incentive for family
members to become kinship caregivers.' 42 Critics of this option con-
tend that it creates a disincentive for poor parents to seek reunifica-
tion43 because a parent may recognize that the relative can better
provide for the child with the larger foster care payment than the
parent can.'"
The third option allows the kinship caregiver to choose be-
tween being treated the same as a traditional foster parent and being
treated differently with regard to both license requirements and
payments. 145 If a kinship caregiver selects the latter, the state may
waive some licensing requirements and also reduce the foster care
payment.46 This flexible approach recognizes that kinship caregivers
may have different needs than traditional foster care parents and
does not force them into a system ill-designed to meet their needs. 47
In addition to determining what standards to apply to kinship
caregivers, states must also define who qualifies as a kinship
caregiver. Some states require that a kinship caregiver be closely
137. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(aX19) (West Supp. 1998).
138. See TAKAS, supra note 15, at 37; see also Mandelbaum, supra note 120, at 922-23.
139. Only seven states (Arkansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
and Wisconsin) have enacted statutes concerning kinship care. See TAKAS, supra note 15, at 37.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 38.
142. The states that have adopted this option have had the most dramatic increase in their
kinship care populations. See id.
143. See id; see also Naomi Karp, Kinship Care: Legal Problems of Grandparents and
Other Relative Caregivers, NAT'L B. AssN MAG., JanJFeb. 1994, at 10.
144. See TAKAS, supra note 15, at 38.
145. See id. at 39.
146. See id.
147. See id.
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related to the child's parent by blood, marriage, or adoption.148 Other
states extend the definition by including close friends of the family
and godparents.'49
These differences among the states demonstrate the need for a
federal standard for kinship care, not just a statutory preference.
Although states create their own foster care standards, they first look
to federal guidance. Because the ASFA contemplates kinship foster
care in three different sections, the government may soon create a
federal standard. First, ASFA section 303 requires that the Secretary
of Health and Human Services convene a kinship care advisory
pane' 5° to review and comment upon a report detailing states' kinship
care policies.' 51 The Secretary is then required to submit the report
and make policy recommendations about kinship care by June 1,
1999.152
Congress also authorized demonstration projects for alterna-
tives to foster care.153 Among the types of demonstration projects the
secretary is required to consider "[i]f an appropriate application... is
submitted"15 4 is a project "designed to address kinship care." 155
148. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAm. LAW § 5-534(a) (Supp. 1997) (Klinship parent' means
an individual who is related by blood or marriage within five degrees of consanguinity or affinity
under the civil law rule to a child who is in the care, custody, or guardianship of the local
department and with whom the child may be placed for temporary or long-term care other than
adoption."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-2-414(3XA) (Supp. 1997) ("Relatives within the first, second
or third degree to the parent or step-parent of a child who may be related through blood,
marriage or adoption may be eligible for approval as a kinship foster parent.").
149. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7004-1.5(D) (West 1998) ("A person related by
blood, marriage, adoption and by emotional tie or bond to a child may be eligible for approval as
a kinship parent.").
150. The panel "shall include parents, foster parents, relative caregivers, former foster chil-
dren, State and local public officials responsible for administering child welfare programs,
private persons involved in the delivery of child welfare services, representatives of tribal
governments and tribal courts, judges, and academic experts." ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89,
§ 303(b)(1), 111 Stat. 2115, 2129-30 (1997).
151. In addition to the states' policies, the report must contain the characteristics of
kinship caregivers and their households, the extent of parental contact with the child, the cost
of kinship care, and the services provided by the state to the caregiver and to the parent. See id.
§ 303(aX2XA), 111 Stat. at 2129.
152. See id. § 303(aX1XB), ll Stat. at 2129.
153. See 42 U.S.CA. § 1320a-9 (West Supp. 1998).
154. Id. § 1320a-9(3)(C).
155. Id. The other two proposals required to be considered are projects "designed to
identify and address barriers that result in delays to adoptive placements for children in foster
care," id. § 1320a-9(3XA), and projects
designed to identify and address parental substance abuse problems that endanger
children and result in the placement of children in foster care, including through the
placement of children with their parents in residential treatment facilities.., that are
specifically designed to serve parents and children together in order to promote family
reunification and that can ensure the health and safety of the children in such
placements.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the ASFA allows states
to exempt a child in the care of relatives from the provision requiring
the states to file or join termination of parental rights after the child
has been in foster care for fifteen months. 56 By including these three
provisions, Congress has recognized that kinship foster care should be
included as part of federal child welfare policy.
C. The Benefits of Kinship Foster Care
Kinship care should be an integral part of federal foster care
law for numerous reasons. First, children placed in kinship care
usually do not experience multiple placements, unlike their counter-
parts in traditional foster care. 15' 7 Second, kinship foster parents can
more likely provide a home for all of the children in a family, 58 thus
preventing the division of siblings. Third, because children generally
have relationships with their kinship foster parents before placement,
such a placement often lessens the trauma typically involved when
the state takes custody of the child. 59 Many children who are in
kinship foster care arrangements may also avoid the stigma
associated with foster care.' 60 Instead, the child remains a part of the
family he or she has known and continues the relationships that de-
fine him or her: sister, brother, grandchild, cousin, nephew, niece.
Further, these children are also more likely to remain in contact with
their biological parents. These psychological benefits of kinship foster
care' 6' contrast with many of the psychological dangers associated
with termination of parental rights. 62
Kinship foster care not only offers these psychological benefits
to children, but it also has the potential to benefit state child welfare
policy. Because most kinship caregivers are willing to care for sibling
groups, the burden on agencies to find multiple foster homes for chil-
dren and to recruit foster families is lessened. 68 Further, because
most kinship foster caregivers must be licensed, they are qualified to
Id. § 1320a-9(3XB).
156. Id. § 103(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2115, 2118 (1997) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (1994)).
157. See MICKENS & BAKER, supra note 23, at 1.
158. See Marla Gottlieb Zwas, Note, Kinship Foster Care: A Relatively Permanent Solution,
20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 354 (1993). It is estimated that 44 percent of foster children are
placed in the same kinship foster care family with all their siblings. See id. at 354-55.
159. See MICKENS & BAKER, supra note 23, at 1.
160. See Zwas, supra note 158, at 354.
161. Some of the dangers of kinship foster care will be discussed infra notes 166-70 and
accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
163. See Zwas, supra note 158, at 354-55.
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be traditional foster parents to other children as well.'6 As a result of
both the benefit to the child and to the state, at least one comnenta-
tor has argued that absent evidence to the contrary, "placement with
a relative caregiver should be considered the best initial, temporary
and permanent option for a child if the child cannot be placed with his
or her parents."161
D. A Cautious Approach
Despite the above benefits, Congress should not implement a
kinship care standard until it carefully studies the benefits and risks
involved. First, studies have shown that intergenerational cycles of
abuse exist, and therefore some potential kinship foster care
providers will pose a risk to children that generally is not present in
traditional foster care arrangements. 166 Many child welfare agencies
neither carefully scrutinize kinship caregivers before the placement
nor conduct thorough follow-ups after placement.67 Instead, some
agencies assume that the placement is in the child's best interests. 6 8
Second, some kinship caregivers resist child welfare services and
resent state intrusion in family matters. 69 Third, kinship foster care
parents may allow unsupervised contact with the child's parents,
which puts the child at risk.170
Although these are sound reasons to exercise caution, other
criticisms of kinship foster care prove unconvincing. Many criticize
kinship foster care as a way for parents to milk the government of
more money, because foster care payments are typically much larger
than Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF") payments. 17'
Indeed, one critic stated that kinship care "only marginally changes
164. See id. States, however, have the option of relaxing requirements for kinship foster
care providers. See TAKAS, supra note 15, at 38. Kinship caregivers may therefore not be able
to provide traditional foster care without being relicensed.
165. Mandelbaum, supra note 120, at 927-28.
166. See Zwas, supra note 158, at 359 n.123.
167. See, e.g., Wilder v. Bernstein, No. 78 Civ. 957 (RJW), 1998 WL 355413, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
July 1, 1998) (citing a study that indicates a majority of children are placed in kinship foster
homes without regard for their safety or without following state-mandated placement
procedures).
168. See Zwas, supra note 158, at 361-62.
169. See id. at 363.
170. See id. at 360.
171. See Bruce Chapman, inship Care' the Latest Way to Game the Social Welfare
System-And it is the Children Who Will Pay the Price, SsAms POS-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 10,
1997, at A13.
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the child's real situation but qualifies for subsidies."172 While the fact
that foster care payments greatly exceed other types of welfare is
disturbing, the proper target for the criticism is the policy of providing
more money to a foster parent than a biological one. The funds are
intended to pay for the child's living expenses, not to reward or
punish the caregivers.
Another criticism of kinship foster care is that it fails to pro-
vide permanency for children because kinship foster care parents are
less likely to adopt the child.173 Many kinship caregivers believe
adoption is not necessary.174 Others "fear becoming embroiled in an
adversarial process that pits parents against sons and daughters,
siblings against sisters and brothers."175 Although it is true that
kinship foster children generally spend more time in state custody
than traditional foster children, 76 this is only a legitimate criticism if
children truly value their legal label."77 One suspects, however, that a
child living with a relative either temporarily, or permanently without
ever being legally adopted, does not focus on his or her legal status.
E. Kinship Foster Care and Keeping Families Together
The foster care system seeks to preserve families that can
remain intact.178 This fundamental principle underlies kinship foster
care and other community-based programs that support troubled
parents.
172. Id. Chapman argues that "[slome kinship care ... makes sense, but too often it means
returning de facto control to parents whose custody was so dangerous as to have had them
removed in the first place. Too often it provokes scams in which children can be passed around
from relative to relative and the foster care payments enjoyed as a kind of super-welfare
benefit-for the relatives." Id.
173. More kinship foster care parents are willing to consider adoption than previously as-
sumed, but "significant proportions still are uncomfortable with [adoption]." Child Welfare
Revision: Testimony before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Family Policy of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong., available in 1997 WL 10572021 (statement of Gary J. Stangler,
Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services).
174. See id. 'They feel that their relationship to the children already is permanently sealed
by the virtue of their blood ties." Id.
175. Id.
176. See Zwas, supra note 158, at 364.
177. See Goldhill, supra note 10, at 302 (stating that "the permanent loss of ties to their
family of origin may be far more significant than anything a legal label can offer.").
178. In discussing the ASFA, Senator Dewine noted that "we need to make sure that the
families who are in trouble, but who can be saved, do get help, and that they get good help, and
that they get it before it is too late." 143 CoNG. REc. S12,670 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997).
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As demonstrated by the story of Tammy Hawkins, kinship care
encourages family preservation.17 9 In her case, care of Hawkins'
children by relatives allowed her to eventually regain custody. In
May 1993, the state removed Hawkins' two children from her custody
and placed them in a kinship care home with her sister.'80 In January
1997, after gaining employment, finding an affordable apartment, and
enrolling her children in school, she regained custody of her children,
almost four years after they entered the foster care system.18' A year
later, Hawkins remains clean, off welfare, and works two jobs to
support her children.18 2 Hawkins' children also express a desire for
reunification with'their mother.13
A comparison of kinship care and traditional care shows the
value of the former in many cases. Under the ASFA, Hawkins' paren-
tal rights would have been terminated by timeline termination,
without a true "best interests of the child" inquiry. Under the
AACWA, the children would likely have experienced the instability of
multiple placements during their four years in foster care and might
have lost contact with each other. In both scenarios, it is unlikely
that the children would have visited their mother on a frequent basis.
Because kinship foster care was available to these children, however,
the children lived with relatives unseparated from each other until
their mother was ready and able to resume care for them. Although
kinship care will not be available or advisable for all children, federal
foster care law should include a kinship foster care policy.
V. IMPLEMENTING A FEDERAL KINSHIP FOSTER CARE STANDARD:
A PROPOSAL
The AACWA and its emphasis on reunification increased the
state ward population, as many children spent their childhoods in the
system. By swinging the pendulum from "reasonable efforts"
reunification to timeline termination of parental rights, the ASFA has
179. Dale Russakoff, Against the Odds, a Failed Mother Returns to Her Children, WASH.
POST, Jan. 20, 1998, at Al.
180. See id. In June 1995, after she was arrested for violating her parole, the social
services department determined that reunification could no longer be the goal for her children
and that long-term foster care with their aunt was the proper disposition.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. Her sixteen-old-daughter greets her mother when she comes home from work with "I
love you to infinity." When her children visited her new apartment for the first time, before she
regained custody, it snowed, prompting her ten-year-old son to say, "I want to get snowed in and
stay forever." Id.
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the potential to create a population of engineered orphans whose ties
to their biological parents are permanently severed without a
guarantee of adoption.'8 In between these two extremes, there exists
a more moderate approach: kinship foster care.
By encouraging family contact and support, kinship foster care
may avoid some of the psychological harm that termination causes
children. Because of some of the problems associated with it, how-
ever, Congress should wait until it receives sufficient information
before including kinship foster care formally within federal foster care
policy. After acquiring adequate information, Congress eventually
should adopt a federal standard that includes a consideration of the
following factors.
First and most importantly, Congress should mandate that the
primary consideration in determining whether kinship foster care is
appropriate in a given situation is a true "best interests of the child"
analysis. The adjudicator should carefully balance factors relating to
the child's safety, mental health, and emotional health in each indi-
vidual case. These factors should include: the child's relationship
with the potential kinship caregiver; the potential caregiver's rela-
tionship with the parent; the child's need to maintain family and
cultural connections; the potential caregiver's attitude toward work-
ing with state social services; the extent and type of contact the par-
ent will have with the child while he or she is in foster care; whether
the potential caregiver is willing to provide care for the child's sib-
lings; and whether the potential caregiver is willing to provide long-
term care for the child if necessary.185
Second, the federal standard should give the states guidance
on implementing licensing criteria for kinship caregivers. Willing
kinship foster parents should not be denied custody of a child, if the
placement is found to be in the child's best interests, on the basis that
they are unable to satisfy statutory requirements that do not relate
directly to child safety. For example, states often have very specific
requirements regarding the size and furnishings of a licensed foster
care home.186 These requirements can easily be substituted with a
184. This is worrisome because children who "age-out" of the system generally have
difficulty in becoming successful adults. Only 17 percent become completely self-supporting.
Only about half graduate high school and a little less than half gain employment. Almost 60
percent of girls who "age-out" have children within a few years. 143 CONG. REC. S12,211 (daily
ed. Nov. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
185. See MCK NS & BAKER, supra note 23, at 11-12.
186. See TAKAS, supra note 15, at 43.
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less demanding standard for kinship care homes without risking child
safety.187
Although states should relax standards for kinship caregivers,
states should not assume that kinship arrangements require less
supervision than traditional foster care arrangements. Kinship care
homes must receive the same attention and support as traditional
foster care homes.
Third, the federal standard should define kinship caregivers
broadly enough to include any adult with whom the child has an es-
tablished relationship. No evidence suggests that the benefits of
kinship care are tied to blood or marriage. A close family friend or
godparent whom the child trusts would be equally able to provide
stability for the child.
Finally, a federal kinship care policy should not be limited to
foster care. Rather, "reasonable efforts" to prevent the placement of a
child in foster care should include a kinship care plan. This policy
would encourage parents, before removal is necessary, to ask friends
and family members for advice and assistance in caring for their
children.
These suggestions outline an anticipated federal standard for
kinship care. Because state-structured kinship foster care is a rela-
tively new policy, it will take further study to determine what other
considerations are important in determining the advisability of kin-
ship care. Until we know more, however, we can implement a stan-
dard that protects the child and supports the family by refocusing on
the best interests of the child.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that both the AACWA and the ASFA
embody the extremes of the pendulum-swing between reunification
and termination. Recognition of middle ground is the only way to stop
the pendulum. Kinship care is a unique arrangement that can
provide a more moderate approach to foster care.
187. See id.
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Congress will likely incorporate kinship care into federal foster
care law policy within the next few years. Skillfully crafted, this
could provide stability for children and ensure that families that can
be saved get the necessary help to remain whole, which would be in
the best interests of the child, the parent, and the state.
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